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COMMENTS

The Canada-United States Memorandum
of Understanding Regarding Application of

National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines
for Resolution of Multinational Antitrust
Enforcement Disputes
I.

INTRODUCTION

The extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust law
against Canadian businesses has been a source of continual conflict between the two nations.' In spite of intervening periods of cooperation
and occasional recognition of mutual benefits arising from such extraterritorial antitrust enforcement,2 several obstacles to lasting conciliation
periodically resurface.3 The practical necessities of growing international
economic interdependence, 4 combined with a divergence between views
1 See Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends: Canada and the United States in the Mid1970's, 11 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 165 (1978); Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct
Outside the UnitedStates: A View From Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.. 195 (1978), Extraterritorial
Antitrust Conference, 2 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 152 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Conference].
2 See, e.g., Campbell, The Canada-UnitedStates Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure: A Study in BilateralConflict Resolution, 56 CAN. B. REv. 459 (1978); Stanford, supra note 1,
at 195.
3 See Campbell, supra note 2, at 493. The author states that
... the continued presence of aggravating disputes.... the continued irritation over the issues of
sovereignty and extraterritoriality, the residual bitterness and cynicism, are less a reflection of a
failure of institutions, or technical arrangements or good will as they are a reflection of a failure
in attitudes.
Id See also infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
4 Gotlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 449 (1983).
The author defines economic interdependence as "the complex patterns of international economic
ties that bind countries together and make them mutually dependent..." Id at 450. See also
Campbell, supra note 2; Commission on the InternationalApplication ofthe US. Antitrust Laws Act:
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and interests of the United States and Canada regarding the proper role
of antitrust enforcement,5 have provided an environment ripe for conflict. In 1959, following differences that arose in the Radio Patents
cases, 6 the two countries responded by instituting an informal antitrust
enforcement notification and consultation procedure, known as the
Fulton-Rogers Understanding.' In 1969, the Understanding was modified in accordance with EEOC international guidelines for resolution of
antitrust enforcement issues.' In spite of the existence of these guidelines, serious conflict again emerged in the context of the Potash9 and
Uranium cartel'0 disputes of the 1970's. A general lack of specificity in
the procedural guidelines,"U as well as a failure to appreciate the alternative perspectives and interests of the countries involved 2 have been cited
as among the primary reasons for the failure of the Fulton-Rogers
Understanding.
In 1984, Canada and the United States reached a new Understanding, 13 representing the most recent attempt by the two nations to estabHearingson S. 432 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, 61 (1981) (remarks
of L. Cutler) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
5 See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text. Baker, supra note 1, provides an interesting
analysis of how the different economic realities confronted by the two countries affect their attitudes
toward antitrust enforcement and extraterritorial jurisdiction.
6 United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), modified, 115 F. Supp.
835 (D.N.J. 1953).
7 See House of Commons Debates, 1959, Vol. 1 pp. 617-19 (hereinafter cited as House of Commons Debates). This Understanding is also known as the Basford-Mitchell Understanding, after the
names of the officials who agreed to modifications in 1969. See Canada-UnitedStates: Joint Statement Concerning Cooperation in Antitrust Matters, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 1305 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Joint Statement].
8 Id.
9 See Indictment, U.S. District Court Illinois, United States v. Amax, Inc., Amax Chemical
Corp., Duval Corp., Duval Chemical Corp., National Potash Co., Potash Co. of America. Criminal
Action No. 76 CR 783, June 29, 1976; United States v. Amax Inc., et al, Civil Action No. 76 C 2393,
June 29, 1976. For a discussion of the details of this case in relation to this Comment, see infra text
accompanying notes 107, 132-33 and 156. For a detailed description of the case itself, see Campbell,
supra note 2, at 486-87.
10 These suits were consolidated in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.
Ill. 1979). See also Westinghouse v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., [1978] 1 All. E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977). For a discussion of these cases in relation to this Comment, see infra text accompanying notes 108, 131, 156-57, 167 and 180. For detailed discussions of
the cases themselves, see Campbell, supra note 2, at 487-90; Kohlmeier, The Uranium Affair, 13 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 149 (1978).
11 Note, A Comparative Analysis of the Efficacy of BilateralAgreements in Resolving Disputes
Between Sovereigns Arisingfrom Extraterritorial
Application ofAntitrust Law: The Australian Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 49, 65-68 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note].
12 See Campbell, supra note 2, at 493.
13 Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween the Government of the UnitedStates ofAmerica and
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lish a format for early identification of potential conflict arising out of
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement, 14 for consideration of alternative
state interests in activities undergoing scrutiny,'" and for possible modification of enforcement plans in light of such divergent interests. 16 The
history of conflict between Canada and the United States, including previous failures to amicably and efficiently resolve such disputes, 17 presents

a useful context in which to assess whether the 1984 Understanding will
surround national antisucceed in alleviating the tensions that frequently
18
trust enforcement in the multinational arena.
This Comment will first examine the fundamental policy differences
and opposing perspectives underlying the conflict between Canada and

the United States regarding extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. Particular conflict areas will then be discussed. Second, this Comment will
explore the reasons underlying the failure of the Fulton-Rogers Under-

standing to prevent instances of serious disagreement concerning particular antitrust enforcement measures taken by the United States during the
1970's. Third, this Comment will analyze the 1984 Understanding, focusing on its departure from the weaknesses of the Fulton-Rogers Understanding, its specific provisions addressing concerns within the major

categories of previous conflict, and its likely successes and failures in

eliminating future conflict in light of the difficulties encountered in previous cases. Finally, this Comment will conclude that, while the 1984 Understanding is of great value as an expression of renewed interest in
mitigating future conflict between the two nations,' 9 and while its dethe Government of Canadaas to Notification, Consultation, and Cooperationwith respect to the Application of NationalAntitrustLaws, reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Understanding]. The 1984 Understanding supersedes the previous agreements of 1959 and 1969. 1984
Understanding,at § 12.
14 Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 establish procedures for various types of notification and consultation.
1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at §§ 2-5. For a discussion of these provisions, see infra text
accompanying notes 153-57.
15 Section 6 provides for consideration of the other party's significant interest. 1984 Understanding, supranote 13, at § 6. For discussion of these provisions, see infra text accompanying notes 15963.
16 Section 7 provides for elimination or minimization of conflicts arising out of antitrust investigative or enforcement activities. 1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at § 7. For discussion of these
provisions, see infra text accompanying notes 164-67.
17 See text accompanying infra notes 131-41, Campbell, supra note 2.
18 See Campbell, supra note 2. For an assessment of the international law implications of antitrust enforcement conflict between the United States and Australia, see Triggs, Extraterritorial
Reach of United States Anti-Trust Legislation The InternationalLaw Implications of the Westinghouse Allegations of a Uranium Producers' Cartel, 12 MELB. U.L. REv. 250 (1979).
19 The stated purpose of the 1984 Understandingreads as follows:
This Memorandum of Understanding outlines arrangements for notification and consultation between the Parties with respect to the application of their respective antitrust laws, with
the purpose of avoiding or moderating conflicts of interests and policies. The Understanding
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tailed procedures for early identification, recognition, and evaluation of
diverging national interests involved in transnational antitrust proceedings represent a vastly improved dispute settlement regime, it contains
few meaningful substantive provisions which might serve as guarantors
that the interests brought to light through implementation of the procedural guidelines will be fairly reconciled. The 1984 Understanding thus

constitutes but one step toward the ultimate goal of establishing broadly
applicable substantive provisions for resolution of multinational antitrust
enforcement disputes.2"
II.

SOURCES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST CONFLICT
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

Differing national economic needs and fundamental policy divergence have been identified as major sources of antitrust enforcement conflict between Canada and the United States.2 1 The two nations have
different views regarding the appropriate role of government in regulatalso establishes procedures for closer cooperation in order to enhance the substantial benefits
which both derive from mutual assistance in the enforcement of their antitrust laws.
1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at § 1.
20 The notion that procedural guidelines are alone insufficient for resolution of international
antitrust enforcement conflicts is not without support. See, eg., Campbell, supranote 2. The author
concludes that
Successful bilateral dispute settlement requires several critical features. First, a technical
apparatus to allow the early identification and confrontation of problems, perhaps against a
background of some sort of compulsory adjudication to encourage early resolution. Second, the
participation of experts in the particular field in conjunction with other government representatives to ensure that a transnational identity of function does not inadvertently circumvent government policy. Third, an overriding appreciation of the differences in outlook and perception
which characterize the policies of the participants and a willingness to give equal weight, equal
credence to those perceptions.
Iad at 494. See also Stanford, supra note 1. The author states that
...the challenge facing the representatives of governments now involved in consultations to
resolve these issues is to identify principles governing the extraterritorial application of antitrust
law that will be generally acceptable to states engaged in or affected by such conduct. These
principles, if they are agreed upon and respected, can provide the basis for a pattern of state
conduct which could very well evolve into a body of customary international law in this area of
large and growing importance to an economically complex and interdependent world.
Id. at 214. See also Hearings,supra note 4, at 61 (remarks of L. Cutler, calling for the creation of an
international tribunal to adjudicate such disputes). Several suggestions for the infusion of substantive content into extraterritoriality dispute resolution methodology have been proposed, centering
primarily on a conflict of laws approach. See, eg., Ongman, "Be No Longera Chaos" Constructing
a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's ExtraterritorialJurisdictionalScope, 71 Nw. U.L. Rv.
733 (1977); Note, The Conflict of Laws and the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Sherman Act, 4
CASE W. REs. J.INT'L L. 164 (1972); Comment, Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws;
A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.J. 259 (1960). See also infra notes 67-74 and accompanying
text.
21 See Baker, supra note 1;Campbell, supra note 2; infra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
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ing the respective nations' economies.2 2 The theoretical underpinnings of
each nation's economic policies are of great significance in the antitrust
jurisdiction conflict, and are reflected in their respective attitudes toward
23
antitrust enforcement.
United States antitrust law has been referred to as "a charter of economic liberty;"'24 the Sherman Act as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise."2 5 In the United States, antitrust law has taken on an almost
constitutional quality.26 It has been said that United States antitrust law
embodies frontier values, including "a strong sense of the worth of individual effort and the value of individual liberty," 27 as wel as a "solid

distrust of government, a deep lack of respect for those in authority."2 8
It is suggested that these values translate into a preference for an impersonal market as opposed to a paternalistic government; that antitrust law
"embodies a populist suspicion of the big and distant enterprise and tries
to curb or break up visible private economic power." 29 With respect to
United States foreign economic policy, four broad goals have been
identified:
The first of these goals is the promotion of open and competitive markets
for both imports and exports. The second is the maintenance of amicable
diplomatic relationships with the nations with whom we trade. The third is
the assistance of American workers and enterprises when they suffer sudden, substantial, and sometimes unfair, but remediable hardship in international competition. The fourth goal-no less important for being only
recently recognized-is the facilitation of export opportunities for U.S.
goods and services. 30

These goals are reflected in United States antitrust enforcement policy in
general, and it is useful to keep in mind their manifestation and interplay
in the international antitrust enforcement context.
22 Baker, supra note 1; Campbell, supra note 2. See also infra notes 23-40 and accompanying

text.
23 Baker, supra note 1, at 172. The 1984 Understanding recognizes the contribution of these
factors to previous conflict in its acknowledgement that "there are differences between the Parties on
the appropriate application of national antitrust laws to conduct occurring wholly or partly outside

the territory of the applying Party," and in its notation that "the application of United States antitrust laws in the past has occasionally conflicted with Canadian policies and has raised jurisdictional
issues
24
25
26

in Canada." 1984 Understanding,supra note 13 (introductory paragraphs).
N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Topco].
Baker, supra note 1, at 167. In the Topco case, the court analogized the Sherman Act to the

Bill of Rights. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610.
27 Baker, supra note 1, at 166.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Rosenthal, What Should be the Agenda of a PresidentialCommission to Study the International Application of U.S. Antitrust Law?, 2 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 372, 372-73, (1980).
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Canadian antitrust law3" occupies a far different place in the overall
scheme of economic regulation. "The Canadian reality is shaped by a
different economic history, characterized by a concern for the high degree of foreign involvement in the Canadian economy and a more chari'
table view of the role of government in the regulation of the economy.

32

In Canada, restrictive trade practices are viewed as one problem among

many which government regulation must address in considering the
global economic picture. 3 Consequently, Canadian antitrust law is
"unambitious and territorial in scope. . . reflecting the belief that the
pure protection of competition must give way to the need to ensure the

survival of Canadian industry....
The Canadian economy is also characterized by a relatively small
number of firms within a given vital industry, which may require a relaxed or supportive antitrust regime and, frequently, the protection of
government involvement to remain viable in the rigorous export trade
environment.35 In contrast, the primacy of the goal of independent and
unrestrained markets in the United States economic scheme results in the

view that businesses unable to compete on their own in the domestic or
international marketplace are better sacrificed to the "god of competition" than propped up through government involvement.3 6
In spite of these differing attitudes toward government regulation
and antitrust enforcement, there is a great deal of commonality between
the two nations, 37 and the benefits to Canada of having a contiguous
neighbor with a vigorous system of domestic antitrust enforcement do

not go unnoticed.

8

The close interrelationship between the economies of

the two nations is frequently acknowledged, however, as providing both
31 Combines Investigation Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. C-23 (1970) as amended
32 Baker, supra note 1, at 169-71; see also Campbell, supra note 2, at 483.
33 Campbell, supra note 2, at 483.
34 Id. at 494.
35 Id at 484. This situation may be contrasted with predominantly domestic industries, in
which oligopoly ordinarily requires more vigorous antitrust enforcement.
36 Id.

37 See Stanford, supra note 1, at 195, 197. See also Campbell, supra note 2, at 459.
38 See, eg., Stanford, supra note 1, at 195, where the author states that
Fortunately for Canadians, the United States has a well-developed and vigorously enforced
system of domestic antitrust law. The pattern of commercial conduct that this requires of the
U.S. private sector has an effect on the conduct of U.S. corporations when they enter the Canadian economy. Because the antitrust policies of our two countries are so similar in their broad
fundamental objectives, this spillover effect is welcomed in Canada as beneficial. My colleagues
in the Canadian Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs have spoken of the serious
problems they would experience if they had to enforce Canadian anti-combines legislation next
door to a cartelized U.S. economy.
See also Davidson, The CanadianResponse to the Overseas Reach of United States Antitrust Law:
Stage I and Stage H Amendments to the Combines Investigation Act, 2 CAN.-U.S. L.J 166 (1979).
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a vast conduit for application of United States antitrust law against Canadian firms,39 and as constituting an environment within which multinational industries are frequently pressured by opposing economic
interests of the two nations. 40
Conflict arising within the context of particular antitrust enforcement proceedings owes its genesis to these fundamental philosophical
and political differences. 41 Upon initiation of United States antitrust enforcement proceedings, in which these differences become manifested as
constrictions upon foreign sovereignty, the infringement is usually attributed to excessive assertion of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction.42
Problems generically identified as "jurisdictional," however, comprise a
number of conflict categories, some intimately related to assertion of jurisdiction, and some more closely tied to other procedural aspects of
United States antitrust enforcement, or to substantive policy differences.
III.

PRIMARY CATEGORIES OF ANTITRUST

ENFORCEMENT CONFLICT

The conflicts that have arisen due to extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust law can be divided into four major categories.
First, several nations, Canada included, have taken exception to the unusually broad scope of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction in general.43 Second, the allowance of private actions against foreign antitrust
defendants and the accompanying threat of treble damage awards have
engendered a great deal of international animosity.' Third, countries
39 See Campbell, supra note 2, at 482. The author states that
the overwhelming presehe in Canada of American owned subsidiaries has provided vast
transmission channels for the export of United States law and given rise to a fear that American
owned Canadian subsidiaries will suffer a clash of loyalties which will resolve in favour of the
stronger American economy.
Id. See also Stanford, supra note 1, at 201.
40 See Gotlieb, supra note 4. The 1984 Understandingacknowledges the contribution of Canadian-U.S. economic interdependence to the potential for antitrust enforcement conflict, stating that
"the close links between the economies of the two countries may lead to situations in which the
application of the antitrust laws of one Party conflicts with the interests of the other Party.. ." 1984
Understanding,supra note 13 (introductory paragraphs).
41 Baker, supra note 1.
42 See, eg., Gotlieb, supra note 4; Stanford, supra note 1; Triggs, supra note 18. See also infra
...

notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
43 Stanford, supra note 1 (Canadian view); Triggs, supra note 18 (Australian view); Ongman,
supra note 20 (criticisms in general). In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.
1979), the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and South Africa each filed
amicus briefs contesting U.S. jurisdiction over enterprises that had acted abroad. Id at 1253. See
also infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
44 See Hearings,supra note 4, at 58, 62-63 (remarks of K. Brewster and L. Cutler, criticizing
both the allowance of private actions and treble damage awards).
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have been unable to resolve the difficult issues arising out of increased
governmental participation in anti-competitive activities. 45 Finally, in response to what they perceive as excessive United States jurisdictional
reach, several countries have enacted "blocking" statutes, which prevent
the release of information to entities pursuing antitrust enforcement in
the United States.4 6 These statutes have been a major source of concern
to courts and antitrust enforcement agencies in the United States.47 Independent consideration of these primary categories provides a useful
framework within which the likelihood of success of multinational antitrust enforcement guidelines in eliminating future conflict may be
assessed.
A.

The Extensive Reach of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
1.

United States JurisdictionalPrinciples

United States courts and government agencies have broadly interpreted the scope of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction." Subject
matter jurisdiction in the United States over parties engaged in conduct
in foreign lands is based on the objective territoriality principle,4 9
whereby jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of the "effects test."5 The
45 Baker, supra note I, at 175-84. See also infra notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
46 E.g., Business Records Protection Act, [1947] Ont. Stat. c. 10 (codified at Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 54
(1970)); Business Concerns Act, [1957-58] Que. Stat. c. 42 (1985) (codified at Que. Rev. Stat. c. 278
(1964)). These acts prohibit the removal of business records from the respective provinces pursuant
to any request or order from any court outside the province. The acts impose criminal penalties for
non-compliance under some circumstances. See also Uranium Information Security Regulations,
SOR/77-836, 11 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at 4619 (1977) (replacing Uranium Information Security Regulations, SOR/76-644, 110 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at 2747 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Uranium Information
Security Regulations]; Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 21
(Austl.), as amended by Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act,
1976, NO. 202 (Austl.), as implemented by order of the Attorney General. Austl. Gov't Gaz. No.
S.214 (Nov. 29, 1976).
47 See Baker, supra note 1, at 187.
48 See generally Antitrust Division, Antitrust Guide for International Operations, reprinted in
ANTrTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust
Guide]. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa.
1980) [hereinafter cited as Zenith].
49 Ongman, supra note 20. The author states that
The legitimacy of objective territoriality follows from the fundamental assumption of equality
among nation states. If an injury within a state is caused by the conduct of an entity associated
with another nation, the injured nation state must have power to prescribe some rule of law.
Without such power, the second state could injure the first with impunity-an indicium of
superiority.
Id at 749-50, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18 n.3 [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATONs LAW].
50 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter cited as
Alcoa]. See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RLAIioNs LAW, supra note 49, at § 18; Antitrust
Guide, supra note 48, at 6 (which states the jurisdictional test as follows: "When foreign transactions
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most famous expression of this principle is contained in Judge Hand's
statement in the Alcoa 5l case: "... any state may impose liabilities,
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends;
and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize." 2
The extensive jurisdictional reach allowed by this principle has been

criticized by commentators both in the United States and abroad. 3
While at least
two other nations or economic organizations apply the
"effects test,"54 it has been urged that the United States is "alone in attempting to enforce its antitrust laws in the territory of another state.""5
2.

Foreign and Domestic Criticism of United States
JurisdictionalReach

Foreign officials and commentators criticize the extensive assertion

of United States jurisdiction as an attempt by the United States to impose
upon other sovereign nations its view of acceptable economic regulatory
methods. 56 This perceived abuse is viewed as unacceptable interference
with political, as well as economic, elements of national sovereignty. The
vast and potent United States antitrust enforcement scheme is viewed as
an elaborate legal and administrative apparatus employed by the United
States government to implement its legislation abroad and to promote
foreign policy objectives. This is considered by Canadian officials to be a

serious restriction on their ability to exercise political decision-making
have a substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, they are subject to U.S. law regardless of
where they take place."). The Antitrust Guide further states that a firm
...which has no business activities at all in the U.S., may be more difficult to reach under the
U.S. antitrust laws, but the Department will try to include all appropriate defendants in every
case. If [the firm] has property in the United States, it may be seized under certain circumstances to induce consent to the jurisdiction of a U.S. antitrust court
Id at 56.
51 Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416.
52 Id. at 433.
53 See supra note 42. For a domestic criticism, see Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic
Sanctions: The Expansion of United States ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 323
(1981). For an early domestic critique of the jurisdictional principles established in the Alcoa case,
see Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558 (1967).
54 See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrrRUST LAWS 36-37 (2d ed. 1973) (the
European Economic Communities as well as West Germany apply their antitrust laws extraterritorially). West German legislation against competitive restraints expressly applies to conduct occurring
outside the nation which has effects on West German commerce. See Gerber, The Extraterritorial
Application of the GermanAntitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983).
55 Triggs, supra note 18, at 266.
56 See id at 264; Campbell, supranote 2, at 482. For the British point of view on this subject, see
Silkin, The Perspective of the Attorney General of England and Wales, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ExTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS (Griffin ed. 1979) (publication of the A.B.A. International Law Section).
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power with respect to economic relations involving American subsidiaries. One official thus concludes that "the essence of the extraterritoriality
issue is not the economic cost.
but rather the political loss of control
over an important segment of Canadian economic life."5 7

The assertion of far-reaching jurisdiction by United States courts
and government agencies has undergone domestic criticism as well. The
broad interpretation of United States jurisdictional scope has been called
"shortsighted and legally indefensible." 5 8 Some critics have warned that
the reciprocal nature of the relationships involved with our international
trading partners may result in a rebound effect: given its present position, the United States cannot hope to defend against foreign assertions
of equally broad jurisdiction, which would threaten some United States
export activities.59 Domestic criticism also centers on the unprincipled
nature of United States jurisdictional reach, which represents unpredictability-an unacceptable environmental characteristic for those contemplating certain export activities, joint ventures, or other forms of
international investment.' Also noted is the interference with the diplomatic process caused by both agency and private antitrust enforcement
actions. 6 1 In spite of these notable shortcomings, several commentators
57 Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry, Report of the Task Force on the
Structure of Canadian Industry, Government of Canada, Privy Council Office (1968). See also
Campbell, supra note 2, at 485, where the author states that "it is the desire to safeguard Canadian
sovereignty and autonomy which lies at the heart of Canada's rejection of the extraterritorial reach
of American law."
58 Feinberg, supra note 53, at 324, It has also been argued that this broad assertion of jurisdiction is contrary to established principles of international law. Triggs, supra note 18, at 260-63. The
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 49, qualifies the Alcoa test in the following provisions, according to which, in order for U.S. jurisdiction over conduct occurring abroad to
exist:
(1) The conduct and its effect must be generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime
or tort under the laws of states with reasonably developed legal systems, or
(2) the consequences within the territory must be substantial and occur as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory, and
(3) the law prescribing the effect must not be inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states with reasonably developed legal systems.
Id at § 18. For a judicial discussion of U.S. jurisdictional principles in relation to international law,
see Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1178-79. See also Ongman, supra note 20, at 737.
59 See Hearings,supra note 4, at 60 (remarks of L. Cutler, referring to the extensive extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law as "a two edge sword.").
60 See, eg., Snyder, ForeignInvestment and Trade ExtraterritorialImpact of UnitedStatesAntitrust Law, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1965). See also Haight,InternationalLaw and the Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639, 649 (1954).
61 Hearings, supra note 4, at 30 (remarks of J.Griffin, stating that "the commencement of an
agency enforcement action generally preempts [diplomatic] consultations and even when they take
place, undercuts their utility."). In questioning the propriety of judicial evaluation of the policies
involved in a jurisdictional determination in a private suit, one judge has stated that "[w]hen the
courts engage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of the sovereign acts of states, they risk dis-
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support some form of extraterritorial jurisdiction.62
From the United States perspective, extraterritorial jurisdictional
reach is viewed as a necessary corollary to effective, comprehensive antitrust enforcement. 63 One commentator has succinctly stated that "[t]he
relevant markets of antitrust concern are not neatly arranged according

to national boundaries. A nation seeking an effective antitrust policy
must be concerned with restrictive activities off-shore which interfere
with its own economy and society."64 It is also claimed that to eliminate
such jurisdiction would be to
...cede to those foreign interests so inclined the opportunity to have an
anticompetitive extraterritorial impact within U.S. borders, regardless of
the clarity of the anticompetitive intent, the harm caused, the importance of
U.S. economic policies thereby undermined, or the contacts of those persons with U.S. domestic commerce. It would also open a loophole permitting U.S. multinational corporations to encourage their foreign subsidiaries
65
to do what U.S. domestic corporations would be forbidden from doing.

From the Canadian perspective, the role of the multinational corporation in international antitrust enforcement is far different: "The multinational becomes a conduit for the extraterritorial application of
domestic antitrust law, and the antitrust investigation and civil or criminal proceeding become unilateral dispute settlement procedures in what
is clearly a policy conflict between the producer and consumer
' 66
governments.

Out of these divergent viewpoints, some recommendations for limitations on the scope of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction have
emerged.
ruption of our country's international diplomacy." International Ass'n of Machinists v. O.P.E.C.,
649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981).
62 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
63 Rahl, InternationalApplication of American Antitrust Law" Issues and Proposals,2 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 336 (1980). As opposed to elimination of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, the
author states that a more profitable exercise would be to establish limitations on U.S. jurisdictional
reach:
Neither Section 18 of the Restatement [of Foreign Relations Law] nor the Department of Justice Antitrust Guide require [sic] proof of actual intent on the part of a foreign combination to
affect U.S. commerce, whereas intent was a part of Judge Learned Hand's formula.
Ii at 341, citingAlcoa, 148 F.2d at 444 (footnotes omitted). See also infira notes 67-69 and accompanying text. Another commentator has stated that "[t]he United States has an extremely broad view
of the necessary jurisdictional reach of national legislation which is a result of a conscious policy
choice nurtured by a belief that, in an interdependent world, truly effective national regulatory law
requires extraterritorial impact." Campbell, supra note 2, at 480.
64 Raid, supra note 63, at 341.
65 Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 376.
66 Stanford, supra note 1, at 201.
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Suggested Limitations on United States JurisdictionalReach

It has been suggested that the United States should limit assertion of
jurisdiction to conduct that has a "substantialimpact on U.S. import
trade, or... where there exists a substantial and direct private restraint
on the export trade opportunities of firms operating in the United
States."6 7 Other suggestions are that a plaintiff be required to prove that
68
the foreign entity intended to adversely affect the United States market,
or that a conflicts of laws approach be adopted to reconcile alternative
state interests where jurisdictional conflicts exist.6 9
Significantly, several of these recommendations were adopted by the
court in the Timberlane7 ° case, wherein the court employed a jurisdictional "rule of reason" analysis in deciding whether to assert its jurisdiction over foreign defendants once the effects test was met.7 1 The "rule of
reason" involves a comity analysis whereby the interests of a foreign
country involved in a United States antitrust enforcement proceeding are
balanced against the domestic interests in enforcement.7" While this de-

velopment has been considered a singularly important step in limiting the
expansion of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction,7 3 it appears that
this comity analysis is neither easy to implement nor necessarily fair to a
foreign nation's interests.7 4
The jurisdictional rule of reason has not been consistently followed,7 5 which has given rise to further criticism, foreign and domestic,
67 Baker, supra note 1, at 173. The U.S. Justice Department appears to have adopted these
suggestions. See Antitrust Guide, supra note 48.
68 RahI, supra note 63, at 342.
69 See supra note 20.
70 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) cert denied, 53
U.S.L.W. 3895 (U.S. June 25, 1985) (No. 84-1761) [hereinafter cited as Timberlane].
71 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14. For some other limitations adopted by the court, and for
further explanation of the rule of reason analysis, see infra note 72.
72 In his opinion, Judge Choy stated that
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance,
the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614. See also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287
(3d Cir. 1979), where the court employed an analysis similar to that in Timberlane, but treated the
balancing process as part of the jurisdictional determination itself, rather than as an independent
evaluation of whether jurisdiction, once found, should be asserted.
73 Feinberg, supra note 53, at 345.
74 See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
75 See, eg., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
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that United States jurisdictional rules are imprecise and unpredictable.

The legitimacy of judicial adoption of the comity analysis has been questioned as an assumption of discretion requiring Congressional approval. 7" A particularly poignant criticism is that institutional
weaknesses inherent in the courts limit their ability to gather and assess
the relevant evidence and to fairly evaluate the national interests revealed. 8 In addition, other countries may be justifiably reluctant to divulge certain sensitive information through a private participant in a
court proceeding, or without guarantees of confidentiality and use limitation.79 Standing alone, then, courts are simply not equipped to receive
and evaluate evidence of economic policy interests of other nations, with
the consequence that the comity principle may frequently fail to achieve
the desired equitable result. These problems are particularly troublesome in the context of private antitrust actions against foreign defendants, where there is no governmental participation to facilitate
consideration of alternative state interests.8 0
B.

Private Suits and Treble Damages

United States legislative provisions allowing private parties to bring
actions for treble damages against foreign defendants have been heavily
criticized. 8 A United States commentator has observed that "[t]he ease
with which private plaintiffs can threaten foreign companies not only
76 See Note, supra note 11, at 56-57 and n.30.
77 Rahl, supra note 63, at 363. For a Canadian perspective on the comity analysis, see Stanford,
supra note 1, at 213 n.46, where the author states that it is inappropriate for a court, "having identified
a foreign national policy clearly expressed as such by the government, to look behind that policy
and make the application of the principle of comity dependent on whether the manner of the formulation or the implementation of the policy conformed to U.S. domestic procedures."
78 Rahl,supra note 63, at 363; Hearings,supra note 4, at 27-28. See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. 111.1979), in which Judge Marshall stated that "the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate the economic and social policies of a
foreign ountry.. ." Id. at 1148.
79 Stanford, supra note 1, at 205.
80 See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
81 See, eg., Hearings,supra note 4, at 58 and 62. See also Note, Shortening the Long Arm of
American Antitrust Jurisdiction:Extraterritorialityand the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L.
Rnv. 213 (1982). For the British Government's views on private antitrust actions, see United Kingdom Response to U.S. Diplomatic Note concerning the U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Bill,
No. 225, (Nov. 27, 1979), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 847 (1982). The Response states that
* two basically undesirable consequences follow from the enforcement of public law in this
field by private remedies. First, the usual discretion of a public authority to enforce laws in a
way which has regard for the interests of society is replaced by a motive on the part of the
plaintiff to pursue defendants for private gain thus excluding international considerations of a
public nature. Secondly, where criminal and civil penalties co-exist, those engaged in international trade are exposed to double jeopardy.
Id. at 849.
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with the heavy costs of litigation but the possibility of three times the
recovery of actual damages outrages even those of our foreign friends and
allies who understand us best." 2 This "unleashed prosecutorial discretion" granted to private litigants in the United States is not conducive to
consideration of comity and alternative state interests.8 3 Treble damage
awards, unknown in most foreign countries, are viewed as unjust. 84 Because of these deficiencies, elimination of both private actions against foreign defendants 5 and treble damage awards 6 has been suggested. Other
commentators have concluded, however, that these measures, even if
beneficial, would fail to address the ultimate issue. The United States, in
addition to taking such conciliatory measures, must persuade other nations to consider United States interests. An important element of such a
solution is the formulation of "agreed international standards for the application of national competition laws. ... ""
C. The Role of Government in Anticompetitive Activities
There has been a trend toward increased government involvement in
conduct that is the subject of United States antitrust proceedings."8 In
no other situation is the direct policy conflict between sovereign nations
so apparent, leading one commentator to conclude that "[t]he most difficult and important problem [in the international antitrust area] is
whether United States antitrust jurisdiction should be exercised over extraterritorial acts that are incompatible with United States antitrust law
and policy, but are nonetheless consistent with and in furtherance of the
law or economic policy of a foreign sovereign." 9
L

ParticularAreas of Conflict: United States Restriction of the Act of
State and Sovereign Compulsion Defenses
Government involvement in anticompetitive behavior raises sub-is-

82 Hearings,supra note 4, at 58 (remarks of L. Cutler).
83 Id.
84 See Commonwealth Nations Adopt Resolution Criticizing United States Treble Damage Judgments, [Jan.-June] ANTrTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 963, at A-10 (May 8, 1980). In
response to awards of treble damages against its nationals, Great Britain enacted a so-called
"clawback" statute, providing a cause of action on behalf of treble damage judgment debtors to
recollect all but compensatory damages. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6,
reprinted in 1 Current L. Stat. Ann. 11/5. See also supra note 81.
85 Snyder, supra note 60, at 36.
86 Hearings,supra note 4, at 71 (remarks of L. Cutler).
87 Id.
88 Cira, CurrentProblems in the ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. AntitrustLaw, 13 J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 157, 160 (1978). See also Davidson, supra note 38, at 170 and 174.
89 Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 376.
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sues with respect to defenses such as the act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines. 90 The act of state doctrine provides that "[e]very
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment of the
acts of the government of another done within its territory."'" Thus, "a
U.S. court cannot entertain any action that calls into question the validity of conduct or policies of a foreign government acting within its sovereignty." 92 The sovereign compulsion doctrine operates similarly, except
that private conduct allegedly compelled by the sovereign is at issue,
rather than conduct of the sovereign itself.93
Officials and courts in the United States have interpreted these doctrines narrowly. For example, a rule has evolved that in order for immunity from antitrust liability to obtain, compulsion by the foreign state
must be such that the private party could not possibly have chosen to
implement the state directives in a manner that would not have restrained competition.9 4 Mere authorization or approval by the foreign
state is insufficient to justify a grant of immunity. 95 Moreover, under the
which
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,96 governmental participation
97
will result in immunity must not be "commercial" in nature.
In addition to pointing out the undesirable ambiguity in the term
"commercial," 98 commentators have criticized these limitations as focusing not on the interests of the foreign government involved, but rather on
the means chosen by the government to promote those interests.9 9 Thus,
it has been suggested that United States courts should balance the impact
of the restraint in the United States against the importance of the foreign
state interest as expressed in its approval of the anticompetitive behav90 See Baker, supra note 1, at 175-84; see also Campbell, supra note 2, at 469-70.

91 Underhill v. Hemandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
92 Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1194 n.123.
93 Id.The sovereign compulsion doctrine originated in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
94 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1961). The Court
stated that "[t]here is nothing to indicate that [Canadian] law in any way compelled discriminatory
purchasing.... ." Id at 707 (emphasis in original). See also Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1194-95.
95 Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1194-95.
96

28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1977).

Id. at §§ 1603(d), 1605(a)(2).
98 Triggs, supra note 18, at 278; Griffin, American Antitrust Law and Foreign Governments: An
Introduction to the Problem, 12 . INT'L L. & EcoN. 137, 140.41 (1978). In the Act, a "commercial
activity" is defined as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1977) (emphasis added).
99 See Stanford, supra note 1, at 203, 213 n.46.
97

1079

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

6:1065(1984-85)

ior.'1o The outcome of this balancing process would determine whether
one of the doctrines should apply.

A related criticism focuses on the internal inconsistency of the
United States antitrust regime, stemming from the preferential treatment
accorded United States firms involved in export activity.10 1 Under the
Webb-Pomerene Act, °2 for example, United States firms may be exempt
from antitrust prosecution for export cartelization. While most nations

provide similar exemptions, they generally do not simultaneously prosecute identical activities promoted by other nations. Two alternatives
have been suggested for dealing with this inconsistency. First, the
United States could reach agreements with other nations to the effect
that United States export cartel activities having adverse economic effects
within the territory of a nation that is party to the agreement will not be
granted exemption from prosecution under the Webb-Pomerene Act. 103
Second, it has been suggested that other countries should pursue vigorous prosecution of United States export cartel activities existing under
the Webb-Pomerene exemption.1w0 As between the two suggestions, it
would appear that the conciliatory approach of non-exemption agreements would be most conducive to conflict avoidance. 105
100 Baker, supra note 1, at 183.
101 See Note, supra note 11, at 55. But see Letter from Donald I. Baker, then Ass't Attorney

General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Feb. 16, 1977)
partially reprintedin TRADE REr. REP. (CCH) No. 274 (1977), which states that "[W]e have generally followed for some years a policy against suing members of a foreign export association for
conduct which the U.S. would permit under the Webb-Pomerene Act .. " It has also been suggested that Webb-Pomerene exemptions are insignificant in the context of international antitrust law
enforcement. See Rahl, supra note 63, at 345, where the author states that only about 1.5% of U.S.
export activity is covered by such exemptions.
102 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1976).
103 See, eg., Davidson, supra note 38, at 173, where the author states:
For example, if the United States agreed with Canada that it would provide no exemptions for
Webb-Pomerene arrangements when the Canadian market was affected, it would be open to
Canada to make a reciprocal agreement that export exemption under Canadian law would be
lost if the arrangement played against the United States market.
104 Baker, supra note 1, at 193.
105 This is not to say that conflict avoidance is the only, or even the paramount, goal of United

States export policy. See supra text accompanying note 30. To the contrary, where encouragement
of a particular United States export activity is perceived as important, United States authorities may
choose to sacrifice a measure of international economic tranquility by granting an export cartel
exemption in spite of foreign protestations. In such a case, an affected foreign nation will be obliged
to seek recourse through enforcement of its own antitrust law against the United States cartel, resulting in a direct clash between the foreign and United States governments. Where a non-exemption
agreement has been reached, on the other hand, a foreign challenge to the cartelized United States
export activity would be unlikely to produce conflict with United States authorities.
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2. CanadianGovernment Involvement in Anticompetitive Activity: The
Potash and Uranium Cartel Cases
Issues of government involvement in suspect activities have arisen in
several of the most bitterly contested United States antitrust enforcement
proceedings, including the Potash case and Uranium cartel cases.10 6 The
Potash case involved the Canadian provincial government of Saskatchewan. The United States government brought suit against American potash producers, alleging a conspiracy to limit the amount of potash
produced in the United States. Certain high-ranking Saskatchewan officials were named in the suit as unindicted co-conspirators, causing outrage among Canadian citizens."0 7 The Uranium cartel cases included
allegations that a Canadian subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation had participated in the international uranium cartel. The Canadian government
refused to deny the existence of the cartel, and a government official indicated that the cartel activities had been regarded by the Canadian government as falling within its national interest, and that the Canadian
subsidiary's compliance with quota and price provisions had been at the
insistence of the Canadian government.108
Differing attitudes toward acceptable methods of economic regulation played a significant role in exacerbating the conflicts involved in
these cases. In light of Canada's more tolerant attitude toward government regulation, state participation in or approval of the challenged activities could be expected to aid significant Canadian export industries.
One could similarly expect opposition from the United States antitrust
authorities, intensely protective of consumer interests and devoted to
maintaining a high level of competition, especially in staple energy and
raw materials industries.
D. Foreign Blocking Legislation
In response to perceived overly broad assertions of United States
antitrust jurisdiction, several countries have enacted "blocking" statutes,
which prohibit compliance by foreign nationals with United States court
orders, decrees, subpoenas, other forms of process, or requests for information relevant to an antitrust proceeding in the United States. 10 9 While
106 Potash case, supra note 9; Uranium cases, supra note 10.
107 Campbell, supranote 2, at 487. U.S. officials assert that they were very sensitive to the implications of official involvement in the case, and insist that it was the defendant's request for a bill of

particulars that forced public revelation of the names of the Canadian unindicted co-conspirators.
Id at 491.
108 Ma at 489.
109 See supra note 46.
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the effectiveness of such measures is questionable, and detrimental consequences to the foreign parties have been suggested, 110 United States
courts and agencies have been very concerned about the conflict-oriented
implications of such restrictions.'
From the United States point of view, such legislation appears precipitous and premature, directed toward hindering mere investigative activities, rather than enforcement activities." 2 It is also suggested that the
measures may derogate, rather than promote, the interests of foreign parties, since exculpatory information may unwittingly fall within the restrictions of such legislation." 3 In addition, blocking statutes may
simply force United States authorities to proceed on the basis of less reli14
able evidence.1
In order to prevent the disabilities caused by foreign blocking legislation, it is imperative that confidentiality and use limitations apply to
information sought by parties in the United States. Moreover, because
such legislation is enacted as a response to perceived overreaching on the
part of United States courts or antitrust enforcement authorities, the
problem of foreign blocking legislation will only dissipate when foreign
nationals perceive that United States extraterritorial antitrust proceedings are undertaken pursuant to a fair regime of jurisdictional reach,
which includes consideration of foreign interests and respect for state
sovereignty.

IV. THE FULTON-ROGERS UNDERSTANDING
While officials from both Canada and the United States insist that
notification procedures, as outlined in the Fulton-Rogers Understanding,
were followed in the Potash and Uranium cartel cases," 5 these disputes
generated a high degree of animosity between the two countries. 116 In
spite of their recognized value in facilitating information exchange and in
110 Campbell, supra note 2, at 471; Baker, supra note 1,at 187. Blocking statutes may be ineffective or ill-advised principally for two reasons: First, data relevant to antitrust proceedings may be
available from other, non-foreign sources. Thus, American antitrust investigations or prosecutions
may go forward in spite of the blocking laws. Second, in those cases where blocking laws are effective, the international goal of prohibiting restrictive business practices is compromised. See also text
accompanying infra notes 112-114.
111 See, eg., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 939-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
112 Id
113 Id.
114 Id
115 Campbell, supra note 2, at 490.
116 Id. at 486, 490; see also Stanford, supra note 1, at 204-06; Antitrust Conference, supra note I.
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alleviating some tensions on other occasions,117 the notification and consultation procedures failed to diminish the intense conflict surrounding
these incidents. 118
A.

Background and Development of the Understanding

The first Understanding reached between Canada and the United
States regarding antitrust notification and consultation 1 9 evolved out of
a series of United States antitrust enforcement proceedings known collectively as the Canadian Radio Patents cases. 2 ' The cases involved allegations that the defendants (General Electric, Westinghouse, and Philips)
had participated in an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of sections
1. and 2. of the Sherman Act. Participation by a Canadian company,
Canadian Radio Patents Limited, was also alleged.' 2 ' The Canadian
Minister of Justice, however, pointed out that the company had never
violated Canadian law, and that only as a result of the company's allegedly illegal participation in the restraint did Canada have a viable electronics industry.' 2 2 The Minister further suggested to United States
authorities that if any actions in Canada had been inimical to United
States interests, diplomatic consultation, rather than unilateral resort to
the courts, was the appropriate remedial measure.'2 3 United States Attorney General Rogers responded that initiation of the suits was not intended to infringe Canadian sovereignty, but rather to ensure that all
those subject to United States antitrust law were made to comply
therewith. 124
From the discussions held between Minister Fulton and Attorney
General Rogers, the informal Antitrust Notification and Consultation
Procedure emerged. 12 The Understanding provided that, in the future,
discussions would be held between the two governments "when it be117 Campbell, supra note 2, at 469. See also Stanford, supra note 1. The author states that the
previous Understanding has served both countries well by increasing bilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, he states, the previous Understanding was not designed to confront the types of problems
that have arisen more recently between the two countries regarding antitrust enforcement. Id at
196-97.
118 Campbell, supra note 2, at 490, 493.

119 See supra note 7.
120 See, eg., United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
121 Id For a short summary of the developments in the case, see Campbell, supra note 2, at 460-

62.
Campbell, supra note 2, at 461-62. See also House of Commons Debates,supra note 7.
123 Campbell, supra note 2, at 462.
124 Id This response by the United States official begs the question at issue: what is the appropriate scope of U.S. antitrust laws; L., were the Canadian parties involved subject to U.S. law?
125 For a concise history of the developments leading to the Fulton-Rogers Understanding, see id
at 460-63. See also Antitrust Conference, supra note 1.
122
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comes apparent that the interests of one of our countries are likely to be
affected by the enforcement of the antitrust laws of the other." The discussions would be designed to "explore means of avoiding the sort of
situation which would give rise to objections or misunderstandings in the
other country." 12 6 Notification of impending antitrust enforcement
would take place prior to initiation of any suit that would involve the
interests of the other country. This would provide an opportunity for
consultation. Each party would also be kept informed of developments
in pending suits. Each party reserved the right, however, to proceed in
any manner it saw fit, regardless of the outcome of consultations.1 27
In 1969, the Canadian Minister of Consumer Affairs, Ron Basford,
and United States Attorney General John Mitchell agreed to modify the
Understanding in accordance with the recommendations of the
OECD. 2 Consequently, in addition to notification and consultation,
the parties agreed that each country would, insofar as its laws and interests permitted, provide the other with information in its possession of
activities affecting international trade, as required by the other in order
to enforce its restrictive business practices laws. Of primary concern
were cartel and other restrictive practices of multinational companies affecting international trade. The enforcement agencies of the two countries were also to coordinate enforcement activities, each within its own
jurisdiction.12 9 The range of possible results stemming from these procedures has been summarized as follows:
While is is true that antitrust officials of one state might flatly refuse to alter
a course of action in any way, it has often been the case that officials have
been persuaded to modify their course of action somewhat. After consultation, it may be agreed to shape an indictment in a less offensive manner, to
change the ground rules of an investigation so as to require only "voluntary" testimony from foreign witnesses, or that officials of government initiating an investigation or action will keep their antitrust counterparts
informed of progress in a case and allow them to voice their concerns. In
exceedingly rare circumstances,
130 one state may be led to "close a file" at the
other state's urgent request.
B.

The Failure of the Understanding

The failure to maintain harmonious relations in the Potash and Unraium cartel cases resulted from both a procedural breakdown and an
inability to reconcile opposing substantive economic policies. The ab126 House of Commons Debates, supra note 7, at 619.
127 Campbell, supra note 2, at 462.
128 See Joint Statement, supra note 7.
129 Id.
130 Campbell, supra note 2, at 468.
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sence of an established procedure for consideration of government involvement in suspect behavior was apparent in the reaction of the United
States Court of Appeals in the Uranium cases. The court was noticably
disturbed that the Canadian arguments opposing jurisdiction were made
through government authorities as "surrogates" for the true parties in
the case-private businesses against which default judgments had been
entered.'' The parties' inability to reconcile alternative. state policies
was intimately related to the jurisdictional question. In the Potash case,
for example, the Canadians responded to United States allegations by
claiming that the suit was merely an attempt by the United States to
subject Canadian resources to United States law rather than Canadian
law, by virtue of the circumstance that the shares of the potash developing companies were held by United States citizens.' 3 2 United States authorities, on the other hand, felt they had a right and a duty to prosecute
activities occuring in foreign territory having an adverse effect on United
13 3
States commerce.
In the absence of clearly defined procedures and mutually accepted
substantive principles for reconciliation of these opposing views and interests, adversarial positions were assumed and each party unilaterally
acted against the other. In both instances, the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice persisted in its investigations in spite
of apparent sovereign compulsion issues. 34 In the Uranium cartel cases,
Canada, in turn, attempted to circumvent prosecution by enacting the
Uranium Information Security Regulations, 13 preventing Canadian nationals from complying with American requests for information relevant
to the cases.
The failure of the Fulton-Rogers Understanding to alleviate the tensions arising in these cases led one commentator to conclude that
[t]he Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure has been in operation for almost two decades and yet the actions of American tribunals in the
two cases... have caused outrage in Canada. The Canadian Government
has rejected the extraterritorial sweep of subpoenas in these cases and reacted with anger to what some regard as American attempts to control Canadian resources through United States-owned Canadian subsidiaries.
Twenty years have elapsed since the Radio Patents cases necessitated the
131 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Davidson,
supra note 38, at 174, where the author notes that "one of the developments not fully taken into
account by Fulton-Rogers and Basford-Mitchell was the growing involvement of governments in
industrial policies."
132 Campbell, supra note 2, at 487.
133 See id. at 490.
134 Id. at 471.
135 Uranium Information Security Regulations, supra note 46.
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development of the Antitrust Notification
1 36 and Consultation Procedure, but
things appear to have changed little.
Among the general reasons cited for the failure of the Fulton-Rogers Understanding are a "basic misapprehension of national policies and
perceptions, [an unwillingness] to give equal weight, equal credence to
those perceptions," 137 and a fundamental misunderstanding by each side
of what the other expected to accomplish by means of the notification
and consultation procedures. 3 The Canadians expected that the procedures would constitute a means by which United States authorities could
be made aware of Canadian national interests in certain activities, and
thereby be dissuaded from pursuing a meddling course of antitrust enforcement. 139 The Americans, on the other hand, viewed the procedures
as a means for providing Canada with an "opportunity to be heard and
an opportunity to preview upcoming American actions so as to avoid
embarrassment to the Canadian Government."'" The general lack of
specificity in the procedures outlined, as well as a failure to address specific areas of concern such as the role of government in anticompetitive
activities, have also been noted as contributing to the failure of the Understanding to harmonize relations between the two nations."'
IV.

THE

1984

UNDERSTANDING

In contrast to the Fulton-Rogers Understanding, the 1984 Understanding contains an explicit statement of purpose. 142 The statement
greatly diminishes the chance that misunderstandings will arise due to
misconceptions regarding the expectations of the parties. The 1984 Understanding also outlines detailed procedures for advance notification
and consultation with respect to initiation of antitrust enforcement proceedings by one party which may affect the interests of the other.143 It
includes provisions dealing with efforts by one party to withhold infor136 Campbell, supra not 2, at 490.
137 Id at 494. The author further states that
The observations of participants [in the notification and consultation process], past and present,
expose a sociological nightmare of cross-purposes, misunderstandings and misperceptions. At
the bottom of much of the confusion will be found fundamental disagreements about the proper
limits of national sovereignty, the related jurisdictional scope of statutes and the role of government in the regulation of the economy.
Id. at 480.
138 See id at 492.
139 Id
140 Id

141 See Note, supra note 11, at 67-68; Davidson, supra note 38, at 170, 174.
142 1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at § 1.
143 Id at §§ 2-4. See infra text accompanying notes 153-57 for a discussion of these provisions.
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mation from the other,'" and a much needed provision for government
participation in private antitrust suits.' 4 5 The relative strengths and
weaknesses of these provisions can be assessed in terms of whether they
would have reduced the tensions that arose in foregoing disputes between
the two countries, and whether they are responsive to the significant underlying causes of previous conflict.
Foremost among previous causes of disagreement has been the question of appropriate jurisdictional reach. In light of the practical necessities of modem international economic interdependence and the

transcendence of national boundaries by multinational corporations,'"
even Canadian commentators agree that a strict territoriality principle of
national jurisdiction is unworkable. 4 7

Given that the jurisdictional

reach of a nation must extend at times to acts committed outside its territory, the "jurisdictional" problem becomes one of concurrent assertions
of jurisdiction by nations whose enforcement or non-enforcement interests diverge. 14 1 It thus appears that a balancing of those asserted divergent interests is the appropriate means by which to alleviate
jurisdictional conflict. As noted previously, there has been a trend in

United States courts, albeit an erratic one, toward adoption of such a
comity analysis. 49 The United States Justice150
Department's Antitrust Diapproach.
an
such
approved
also
has
vision
One of the barriers to resolution of jurisdictional conflict in the past
has been a lack of consistent, detailed implementation procedures by
which alternative state interests could be evaluated.'
The 1984 Understanding establishes such procedures in its notification and consultation
144 1984 Understanding,supra note 13 at § 5. See infra text accompanying notes 175-80 for a
discussion of these provisions.
145 1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at § 11. See infra text accompanying notes 168-74 for a
discussion of these provisions.
146 See Gotlieb, supra note 4, at 450-52.
147 Id. at 459.
148 Id. at 460.
149 See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
150 Antitrust Guide, supra note 48.
151 Rahl, supra note 63, at 363. See also Note, supra note 11, at 67-68; supra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text. The existence of such procedural barriers to consideration of comity factors is
apparent in the following pre-1984 Understanding comment:
Foreign governments often ask a number of questions about comity. One such question
involves when a foreign government should raise the issue of comity. Is it at the very beginning
of a case, as soon as it is learned that a problem does exist, that there is some investigation and
some questions are being raised? Is it raised after an investigation is launched, indictments are
issued, and complaints are filed? Or is it proper to just stonewall forever, let the complaint be
issued and have a default judgment entered?
Griffin, supra note 98, at 147. The 1984 Understandingshould be very helpful in eliminating such
questions of timing. See infra text accompanying notes 153-57.
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2

A.

Notification and Consultation

The 1984 Understanding contains a detailed list of situations requiring notification to the other party. Inclusion of these provisions alone
represents a great improvement over the vagueries of the Fulton-Rogers
Understanding. Situations requiring notification include those in which
"[a]n antitrust investigation is likely to inquire into activity carried out
wholly or in part in the territory of the other Party," where "there is
reason to believe that the activity is required, encouraged, or approved by
the other Party," where "it is expected that information to be sought is
located in the territory of the other Party," or is "sought to be gathered
by the personal visit of antitrust officials to the territory of the other
Party," or where any investigation "may reasonably be expected to lead
to a prosecution or other enforcement action likely to affect a national
interest of the other Party."' 5 3 Details with respect to timing, recipient
authorities, and content of notification are also delineated."'
Consultations may be requested by either party whenever it "believes that an antitrust investigation, proceeding..., business review, advisory opinion or compliance procedure, or action relating to an antitrust
investigation or proceeding, is likely to affect its significant national interests or require the seeking of information from its territory."15' 5
The explicit delineation of these several procedural guidelines
should be of great assistance in preventing conflicts such as those which
arose in previous cases. In the Potash case, for example, the notification
provision would have been invoked as soon as United States officials
learned that suspect activity had been carried out in Canadian territory.
This would have given the Canadians an opportunity to request consultations, where the involvement of Saskatchewan officials in the activities, as
well as Canadian national interests in the alleged restraint, could have
been discussed. This course of conduct would have been far more respectful than simply naming the Saskatchewan officials as unindicted coconspirators. In the Uranium cases, the Canadian Gulf Oil Subsidiary,
an alleged participant in the international cartel, carefully ensured that
its conduct was consistent with Canadian government policy.' 5 6 Canadian officials also insisted, albeit after enforcement proceedings had been
152 1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at §§ 2-4.
153 Id at § 2.(2).
154 Id at § 2.(3).

155 Id at § 4.
156 Campbell, supra note 2, at 489.
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initiated, that the firm's adherence to cartel price and quota requirements
was in the Canadian national interest.15 7 Government enforcement proceedings and private suits nonetheless continued, and it appears that
these Canadian interests were never given adequate consideration. Effective procedural guidelines would have involved the governments in consultations at a far earlier stage, with the increased likelihood that the
disputes would have been more amicably and fairly resolved.
B.

Consideration of National Interests

It is apparent from the failure of the Fulton-Rogers Understanding
that consideration of alternative state interests is a problem of substance
as well as of procedure.15 1 The "substantive" provisions of the 1984 Understanding are limited to the characteristically vague, but well intended
statements that "[e]ach Party will give careful consideration to the significant national interests of the other at all stages of an antitrust investigation, inquiry or prosecution."' 5 9 Such interests may be "general or
specific in nature depending on the activity in question and may vary in
significance according to the importance of the goals of the relevant government policies and the extent to which achievement of those goals may
be impaired by acceding to the expressed interests of the other Party."' 6
Consideration of national interests is intimately related to the problem of government participation in anticompetitive activity. The 1984
Understanding only hints at how this difficult issue will be resolved in
particular case. Section 6. states that "[w]hile a significant national interest may exist even in the absence of any governmental connection with
the activity in question, it is recognized that such interests would normally be reflected in antecedent laws, decisions or statements of policy by
the competent authorities."' 161 This provision suggests that national interests expressed in an open, formalistic manner may be accorded greater
weight than those averred informally. It will almost certainly continue
to be the case that interests asserted only after enforcement proceedings
have begun will not be given great weight.' 62 The existence of the 1984
157 Id at 489-90.
158 Id. at 493-95. The author states that "[s]mooth working technical agreements and the best of
intentions will be insufficient to guarantee the success of any bilateral framework as long as one or
both sides exhibit a failure to appreciate differences "in national policies, priorities and unspoken
assumptions." Id at 493, quoting Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends- Canada and the
United Statesin the Mid 1970's, Canada-United States Law Institute, University of Western Ontario,

Sept. 30, 1977, p. 2.
159
160
161
162

1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at § 6.
Id
Id

The danger of allowing a government simply to claim a national interest in a given activity
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Understanding thus may not have produced a more amicable resolution
of some of the conflicting interests in the Uranium cases. It is at least
clear, however, that an inquiry will no longer focus solely upon the manner of governmental approval, rather than the substance of the avowed
national interest. This development is in accord with the recommendations of several commentators, 163 and should alleviate some of the tensions that arise in this particularly sensitive area.
C. Minimization of Conflicts
Following consideration of alternative national interests, the parties
will attempt to eliminate or minimize conflicts in the following manner:
First, following notification, and before continuing any investigative or
enforcement measures, the party pursuing enforcement must afford the
other party a reasonable opportunity to request consultations. During
consultations a party believing that its significant national interests will
be affected by the proceedings must "explain in sufficient detail its significant national interest and its role, if any, in the activity in question..."1
Second, "serious consideration" must be accorded
any information or
165
views brought to light during consultations.
The duty of the Parties to attempt to resolve conflict, even in the
face of an apparent standoff, is expressed in the following provision:
The good faith consideration that is to be accorded the national interest of
the other Party during consultations may lead to the avoidance or minimization of a conflict of national interests. If each Party asserts that its own
national interest is predominant and it is unable to defer to the expressed
national interest of the other, they will nonetheless seek to reduce, by accomodation
and compromise, the scope and intensity of the conflict and its
16 6
effects.

The 1984 Understanding appears to contemplate any modification of investigative or enforcement plans necessary to reconcile the opposing state
interests. The possible modifications available would thus presumably be
the same as those extant under the Fulton-Rogers Understanding, inafter enforcement proceedings have begun, and thereby retroactively immunize certain conduct from
prosecution, has been frequently noted. See, eg., Stanford, supra note 1, at 211-13. Most commentators suggest, therefore, that defenses such as the act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines be
limited to interests averred before the activities are questioned by a foreign authority. See id at 211,
where the author suggests that
The state being asked to exercise forebearance in the extraterritorial application of its law
will wish to assure itself, first, that "national interest" is not being invoked ex post facto to cloak
what was essentially a commercially motivated combine or a deliberate attempt to evade its law.
163 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
164 1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at § 7.(2).
165 Id.
166 id at § 7.(3).
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eluding modification of an indictment (e.g., the Potash case), alteration of
investigative measures to protect confidentiality interests, maintenance of
open channels of communication to keep official counterparts informed
and to allow for expression of concerns at any stage of the proceedings,
or, possibly, complete abstainance from investigation or enforcement.
Unfortunately, circumstances may still arise where the parties are
unable to reconcile their opposing interests. In the uranium cases, for

example, it is possible that no Canadian interests or degree of government involvement would have been considered substantial enough by the
United States to allow an international uranium cartel to continue to adversely affect vital United States energy resource markets.16 7 Under such

circumstances, not even the best intentions coupled with the most effective procedural guidelines can ensure that the interests of the parties will
be objectively evaluated and fairly reconciled. When the parties arrive at
this realization, and the only available forums for resolution are those
controlled by one of the parties, unilateral action will again be their only
recourse.

D.

Government Consultation in Private Suits

One of the major problems with the jurisdictional "rule of reason"
lies in the difficulty of implementing the balancing process in the context

of a private antitrust suit. This situation affords little opportunity for the
expression and evaluation of alternative state interests. 16 In an effort to

address this problem, the 1984 Understanding incorporates provisions,
one imperative 169 and one permissive, 17 0 for government participation in
private suits. The imperative provision becomes operative only with re167 Judge Marshall noted that interests involved in the case seemed so inherently contradictory
that reconciliation appeared impossible:
...a balancing test is inherently unworkable in this case. The competing interests here display
an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy. Westinghouse seeks to
enforce this nation's antitrust laws against an alleged international marketing arrangement
among uranium producers, and to that end has sought documents located in foreign countries
where those producers conduct their business. In specific response to this and other related
litigation in the American courts, three foreign governments have enacted nondisclosure legislation which is aimed at nullifying the impact of American antitrust legislation by prohibiting
access to those same documents. It is simply impossible to judicially "balance" these totally
contradictory and mutually negating actions.
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. at 1148. This statement, and the Uranium antitrust cases themselves, substantiate the notion that the difficulties encountered in international antitrust enforcement can involve more than just judicial incapacities, and more than just procedural
barriers. Indeed, it appears that perhaps only an established impartial tribunal applying agreed upon
substantive principles could have resolved the issues arising in these cases to the satisfaction of all
parties. See supra note 20.
168 See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
169 1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at § I11(1).
170 Id. at § ll.(2).
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spect to those proceedings which have been the subject of prior notification and consultation. According to section 2., however, a party may
institute notification, and thereby invoke consultation, whenever it feels
its national interests so warrant. 17 1 Consequently, government participation in a private suit is within the control of a party who feels its interests
are implicated as long as the procedures outlined in the 1984 Understanding are followed. The guidelines should thus provide an incentive
to engage the notification and consultation procedures whenever a possibility that national interests may be impaired by an antitrust proceeding
arises. Participation by the government of the forum nation would simply consist of the requested government agency informing "the court of
the substance and outcome of the consultations." 17 2
Under the permissive participation provision, when the conduct in
question in a private antitrust suit has not been the subject of notification
or consultation, "the Party in whose court the suit is pending may, at the
request of the other Party or on its own initiative, inform the court of
how the national interest of the other party may be implicated by the suit
or may offer to the court such other facts or views as it considers appropriate in the circumstances." 173 In accordance with the spirit of the 1984
Understanding, government officials in the forum country are likely to
respond favorably to a request that they participate in a private suit
under the permissive clause.
Certainly one of the major problems of the past centered on the irrelevance of the diplomatic process in private suits. The provision for
government participation in private suits should prove extremely helpful
in alleviating tensions arising in that type of proceeding, provided that
the interests revealed are given proper consideration by a court in its
comity analysis. More than one federal judge has already acknowledged
the institutional deficiencies of courts attempting to apply the balancing
process. 174 This acknowledgement suggests that interests of the opposing
country, as disclosed to the court by officials of the forum state following
consultations, would be given considerable weight. This important development should result not only in more effective evaluation of national
interests in private suits, but also in increased harmony between the
prosecutorial policies of federal agencies and the jurisdictional policies of
171 Id at § 2.
172 Id at § 11.(1).
173 Id

at § 11.(2).

174 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138; International Ass'n of Machinists
v. O.P.E.C., 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); see also supra note 61.
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the courts. Unfortunately, there is no similarly effective provision in the
Understanding addressing foreign concerns about treble damage awards.
E. Restriction of Access to Information Relevant to Antitrust
Enforcement Proceedings
The approach of the 1894 Understanding to the issue of restriction
of access to information relevant to an antitrust proceeding is similar to
that taken with respect to the question of jurisdiction. That is, it is
largely procedural. The 1984 Understanding provides that "[i]f one
Party seeks to obtain information located within the territory of the other
in furtherance of an antitrust investigation or inquiry, the other Party
will not normally discourage a response." 175 Where a party finds that
disclosure of information is contrary to a significant national interest, any
action relating to access "will normally be made only after notification
and consultations within the framework of, and after taking account of
the purposes of this Understanding. Where, because of an exceptional
circumstance, immediate action must be taken, an opportunity for con'176
sultation will be provided immediately thereafter."
The 1984 Understanding also includes certain conflict-minimizing
clauses, requiring that a party first seek desired information within its
own territory, that it attempt to obtain information from the territory of
the other first through voluntary, rather than compulsory, process, and
that it frame requests for information as narrowly as possible. 177 A provision for general cooperation in antitrust enforcement through exchange
of information between the two governments is also included, 178 as are
necessary confidentiality clauses and use limitations. 1 79 While there is no

provision dealing with information requests in the context of private
suits, it would appear that government participation could be invoked in
response to a subpoena requesting sensitive information.
There is an implicit conciliation observable in the similarities between the information restriction provisions and the general substantive
sections noted above. The 1984 Understanding appears to center around
a compromise whereby Canada has agreed not to restrict access to information in exchange for a commitment by the United States to consider
Canadian national interests before initiating an enforcement proceeding,
and to help bring those interests to light in the context of private suits.
175 1984 Understanding,supra note 13, at § 5.
176 Id
177 Id at § 8.

178 a at § 9.
179 I at § 10.
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The existence of this scheme would have been particularly valuable in the
Uranium antitrust litigation. There, Canadian information access restrictions appear to have been enacted as a direct response to the failure
on the part of agencies and courts in the United States to fairly evaluate
Canadian interests in the alleged cartel activities, or to consider modification of their enforcement and jurisdictional determinations in light of
those interests. 18 0 To the extent that the parties manage a fair consideration of those interests throughout notification and consultation procedures in the future, both the "substantive" and information restriction
sections of the 1984 Understanding should result in improved relations
between the two nations.
V.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing review, it may be observed that Canada-United
States conflict over extraterritorial application of antitrust law derives
from both procedural and substantive elements. Differing attitudes toward appropriate economic regulatory methods have played a significant
role in precipitating conflict, as have the goals of each nation's foreign
economic policy. In the United States, the goal of maintaining open and
competitive markets for both imports and exports is paramount. Unfortunately, realization of this goal with respect to imports conflicts at times
with the objectives of Canadian export policy, which include government
support where necessary to maintain the viability of Canadian industries.
In view of such conflict, it appears that the second goal of United States
foreign economic policy-the maintenance of amicable diplomatic relations with our trading partners-has been given inadequate consideration. In addition, promotion of the United States' third and fourth
goals-protection of domestic industries in international competition and
facilitation of export opportunities--often directly conflicts with the interests of foreign nations. Such "protection," when it involves prosecution of activities occurring in foreign lands, is viewed by other nations as
interference with national sovereignty. Facilitation of export opportunities, particularly when accomplished through preferential treatment
under domestic antitrust law, is considered hypocritical. In light of the
failure of the Fulton-Rogers Understanding to avoid conflict arising out
of the Potash and Uranium cartel cases in the 1970s, it is apparent that
any attempted long term bilateral resolution of the difficulties inherent in
international antitrust enforcement must account for the possibility of
alternative views of appropriate regulatory methods and the sometimes
180 See supra note
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conflicting underlying economic needs and policies of the nations
involved.
As previously noted, both countries insist that notifications were
made under the Fulton-Rogers Understanding in both the Potash and
Uranium cartel cases. It appears, however, that the possibility of diplomatic resolution of these disputes was given rather cursory consideration.
In light of the renewed commitment of the parties to resolve such conflicts amicably and efficiently, as expressed in the 1984 Understanding, it
is reasonable to assume that the diplomatic alternative will be given far
greater attention in the future. The 1984 Understanding should also be
an improvement of great value to the extent that it departs from the procedural weaknesses inherent in the Fulton-Rogers Understanding. The
existence of the new procedural guidelines alone would have contributed
substantially to the reduction of hostilities that arose in previous cases.
Because the 1984 Understanding contains little internal substance, however, it would appear that its procedural guidelines are only valuable to
the extent that the participants remain willing to fairly reconcile alternative state interests brought to light during the notification and consultation procedures. The differing economic realities confronting the two
nations will undoubtedly come to bear in the context of future disputes
over antitrust enforcement within industries vital to both parties. To the
extent that it merely reflects a transient laisse faire attitude on the part of
United States antitrust enforcement authorities, the 1984 Understanding
will prove ineffective in preventing such future fundamental policy
conflict.
Gary E. Dyal
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